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A Recent History of U.S. Sanctions on Russia

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infographic listing U.S. sanctions on Russia

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A Recent History of U.S. Sanctions Against Russia

When a direct military confrontation is off the table, how should countries respond to acts of foreign aggression?

One tactic is sanctioning, which applies economic restrictions on a country’s government, businesses, and even individual citizens. In theory, these penalties create enough impact to dissuade further hostility.

Today, the U.S. maintains more sanctions than any other country, and one of its most comprehensive programs is aimed at Russia. To learn more, we’ve compiled an overview of these sanctions using data from the Congressional Research Service and U.S. Treasury.

Sanctions by Catalyst Event

Sanctions are often introduced after a President issues an executive order (EO) that declares a national emergency. This provides special powers to regulate commerce with an aggressor nation.

Our starting point will be Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, as this is where a majority of ongoing sanctions have originated.

Catalyst: 2014 Ukraine Invasion

On March 18, 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine. This was denounced by the U.S. and its allies, leading them to impose wide-reaching sanctions. President Obama’s EOs are listed below.

Executive order (EO)Date of sanctionsPurpose
EO 13660March 2014Targets those responsible for undermining Ukraine’s democracy
EO 13661March 2014Targets Russian officials operating in the arms sector
EO 13662March 2014Targets those operating in Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors
EO 13685December 2014Prohibits U.S. business in occupied Crimea

Altogether, these sanctions affect 480 entities (includes businesses and government agencies), 253 individuals, 7 vessels, and 3 aircraft.

Sanctions against ships and planes may seem odd, but these assets are often owned by sanctioned entities. For example, in February 2022, France seized a cargo ship belonging to a sanctioned Russian bank.

Catalyst: U.S. Election Interference

The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all imposed sanctions against Russia for its malicious cyber activities.

Executive order (EO)Date of sanctionsPurpose
EO 13757December 2016Targets those who aim to interfere
with the election process 
EO 13848September 2018Targets those that have engaged in foreign
interference of a U.S. election
EO 13849September 2018Expands the scope of previous sanctions
EO 14024April 2021Targets those engaged in malicious cyber activities
on behalf of the Russian government

Altogether, these sanctions affect 106 entites, 136 individuals, 6 aircraft, and 2 vessels. A critical target is the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian company notorious for its online influence operations.

Prior to the 2016 election, 3,000 IRA-sponsored ads reached up to 10 million Americans on Facebook. This problem escalated in the run-up to the 2020 election, with 140 million Americans being exposed to propaganda on a monthly basis.

Catalyst: Various Geopolitical Dealings

The U.S. maintains various sanctions designed to counteract Russian influence in Syria, Venezuela, and North Korea.

Executive order (EO)Date of sanctions*Purpose
EO 13582January 2018,
November 2018,
September 2019
Targets those who provide material support
to the government of Syria
EO 13850March 2019,
March 2020,
January 2021
Targets financial institutions providing support
to the government of Venezuela
EO 13810August 2018,
September 2018
Targets those who engage in significant
transactions with North Korea
EO 13382June 2019,
January 2022
Targets those who contribute to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction
EO 13722November 2020Targets those who trade raw materials or software
with the government of North Korea

*These are recent sanctions pursuant to EOs that were issued many years prior. For example, EO 13582 was introduced in August 2011.

These sanctions impact 23 entities, 17 individuals, and 7 vessels. Specific entities include Rosoboronexport, a state-owned arms exporter which was sanctioned for supplying the Syrian government.

As of December 2020, Syria’s government was responsible for the deaths of 156,329 people (civilians and combatants) in the civil war.

Catalyst: Chemical Poisonings of Individuals

The Russian government has been accused of poisoning two individuals in recent years.

The first incident involved Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer who was allegedly poisoned in March 2018 on UK soil. The second, Alexei Navalny, a Russian opposition leader, was allegedly poisoned in August 2020.

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) allows sanctions against foreign governments that use chemical weapons. Nine individuals and five entities were sanctioned as a result of the two cases.

Catalyst: 2022 Ukraine Invasion

The U.S. has introduced many more sanctions in response to Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine.

EO 14024, which was issued in February 2022, targets Russia’s major financial institutions and their subsidiaries (83 entities in total). Included in this list are the country’s two largest banks, Sberbank and VTB Bank. Together, they hold more than half of all Russian banking assets.

Also targeted are 13 private and state-owned companies deemed to be critical to the Russian economy. Included in this 13 are Rostelecom, Russia’s largest digital services provider, and Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond mining company.

Do Sanctions Work?

Proving that a sanction was solely responsible for an outcome is impossible, though there have been successes in the past. For example, many agree that sanctions played an important role in ending Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

Critics of sanctions argue that imposing economic distress on a country can lead to unintended consequences. One of these is a shift away from the U.S. financial system.

There is no alternative to the dollar and no export market as attractive as the United States. But if Washington continues to force other nations to go along with policies that they consider both illegal and unwise … they are likely to shift away from the United States’ economy and financial system.
Jacob J. Lew, Former Secretary of the Treasury

In other words, sanctions can create an impact as long as the U.S. dollar continues to reign supreme.

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Economy

The Bloc Effect: International Trade with Geopolitical Allies on the Rise

Rising geopolitical tensions are shaping the future of international trade, but what is the effect on trading among G7 and BRICS countries?

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Map showing the change in the share of a country’s exports going to their own trading blocs from 2018 to 2023.

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The following content is sponsored by The Hinrich Foundation

The Bloc Effect: International Trade with Allies on the Rise

International trade has become increasingly fragmented over the last five years as countries have shifted to trading more with their geopolitical allies.

This graphic from The Hinrich Foundation, the first in a three-part series covering the future of trade, provides visual context to the growing divide in trade in G7 and pre-expansion BRICS countries, which are used as proxies for geopolitical blocs.  

Trade Shifts in G7 and BRICS Countries

This analysis uses IMF data to examine differences in shares of exports within and between trading blocs from 2018 to 2023. For example, we looked at the percentage of China’s exports with other BRICS members as well as with G7 members to see how these proportions shifted in percentage points (pp) over time.

Countries traded nearly $270 billion more with allies in 2023 compared to 2018. This shift came at the expense of trade with rival blocs, which saw a decline of $314 billion.

CountryChange in Exports Within Bloc (pp)Change in Exports With Other Bloc (pp)
🇮🇳 India0.03.9
🇷🇺 Russia0.7-3.8
🇮🇹 Italy0.8-0.7
🇨🇦 Canada0.9-0.7
🇫🇷 France1.0-1.1
🇪🇺 EU1.1-1.5
🇩🇪 Germany1.4-2.1
🇿🇦 South Africa1.51.5
🇺🇸 U.S.1.6-0.4
🇯🇵 Japan2.0-1.7
🇨🇳 China2.1-5.2
🇧🇷 Brazil3.7-3.3
🇬🇧 UK10.20.5

All shifts reported are in percentage points. For example, the EU saw its share of exports to G7 countries rise from 74.3% in 2018 to 75.4% in 2023, which equates to a 1.1 percentage point increase. 

The UK saw the largest uptick in trading with other countries within the G7 (+10.2 percentage points), namely the EU, as the post-Brexit trade slump to the region recovered. 

Meanwhile, the U.S.-China trade dispute caused China’s share of exports to the G7 to fall by 5.2 percentage points from 2018 to 2023, the largest decline in our sample set. In fact, partly as a result of the conflict, the U.S. has by far the highest number of harmful tariffs in place. 

The Russia-Ukraine War and ensuing sanctions by the West contributed to Russia’s share of exports to the G7 falling by 3.8 percentage points over the same timeframe.  

India, South Africa, and the UK bucked the trend and continued to witness advances in exports with the opposing bloc. 

Average Trade Shifts of G7 and BRICS Blocs

Though results varied significantly on a country-by-country basis, the broader trend towards favoring geopolitical allies in international trade is clear.

BlocChange in Exports Within Bloc (pp)Change in Exports With Other Bloc (pp)
Average2.1-1.1
BRICS1.6-1.4
G7 incl. EU2.4-1.0

Overall, BRICS countries saw a larger shift away from exports with the other bloc, while for G7 countries the shift within their own bloc was more pronounced. This implies that though BRICS countries are trading less with the G7, they are relying more on trade partners outside their bloc to make up for the lost G7 share. 

A Global Shift in International Trade and Geopolitical Proximity

The movement towards strengthening trade relations based on geopolitical proximity is a global trend. 

The United Nations categorizes countries along a scale of geopolitical proximity based on UN voting records.

According to the organization’s analysis, international trade between geopolitically close countries rose from the first quarter of 2022 (when Russia first invaded Ukraine) to the third quarter of 2023 by over 6%. Conversely, trade with geopolitically distant countries declined.  

The second piece in this series will explore China’s gradual move away from using the U.S. dollar in trade settlements.

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Visit the Hinrich Foundation to learn more about the future of geopolitical trade

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